

Classical Realizability

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Classical Realizability was developed in the middle of the 1990s by Jean-Louis Krivine.

Its aim is twofold:

- Give new models for classical theories (in particular, set theory)

- Understand classical truth in terms which have computational meaning

In this talk, we concentrate on the first aspect.

Outline of the talk:

- 1) Description of Krivine's classical realizability
- 2) Krivine realizability as a tripos/topos construction
- 3) A connection with relative realizability

Sources:

- 1) Papers by Jean-Louis Krivine, see Krivine's home page:
<http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~krivine/>
- 2) Paper *Krivine's Classical Realizability from a Categorical Perspective* by Thomas Streicher (to appear in MSCS); available at Streicher's home page:
<http://www.mathematik.tu-darmstadt.de/~streicher/>
- 3) Lecture Notes by Alexandre Miquel for 'Proofs and Programs' week at Luminy, Feb 13–17, 2012: available at
<http://li2012.univ-mrs.fr/programme/week3/talks/>
Strongly recommended, and shamelessly plagiarized in this talk
- 4) Some work by my student Wouter Stekelenburg (as yet unpublished)

There are two kinds of objects: *terms* (denoted t, t', s, u, \dots) and *stacks* (denoted π, π').

We may have *stack constants* (basic stacks) from a set Π_0 ; we think of a stack as a sequence of closed terms ended by a stack constant. Given a closed term t and a stack π , we have a new stack $t.\pi$.

The terms come from a λ -calculus enriched with extra constants. In this talk, we shall only consider the following extra constants:

For every stack π there is a constant k_π (sometimes called *continuation constants*)

There is a constant α (*call/cc*)

If we denote the set of stacks by Π and the set of terms by Λ , we have therefore the following formal syntax:

$\Pi ::= \alpha | t.\pi$ ($\alpha \in \Pi_0, t \in \Lambda, t$ closed)

$\Lambda ::= x | \lambda x.t | tu | \alpha | k_\pi$ ($\pi \in \Pi$)

An element of $\Lambda \times \Pi$ (typically written as $t * \pi$) is called a *process*. There is a *reduction relation* on processes, generated by the following one-step reductions:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 \text{Push} & tu * \pi \succ t * u.\pi \\
 \text{Grab} & \lambda x.t * u.\pi \succ t[u/x] * \pi \\
 \text{Save} & \mathfrak{c} * u.\pi \succ u * k_\pi.\pi \\
 \text{Restore} & k_\pi * u.\pi' \succ u * \pi
 \end{array}$$

This is called *Krivine's Abstract Machine*. Note that the first two rules implement *weak head reduction*:

$$(\lambda x_1 \cdots x_n.t)M_1 \cdots M_n * \pi \succ\!\succ t[M_1/x_1, \dots, M_n/x_n] * \pi$$

A set of \mathcal{U} processes is *saturated* if $t * \pi \in \mathcal{U}$ whenever $t * \pi \succ t' * \pi'$ and $t' * \pi' \in \mathcal{U}$.

We fix a saturated set of processes: a *pole* $\perp\!\!\!\perp$.

We also fix a set of terms: the set PL of *proof-like* terms. Krivine stipulates: PL is the set of closed terms which don't contain a continuation constant k_π (this may be too strict).

Logic

Consider a language in second-order logic: we have certain first-order constants, function symbols and relation symbols; first-order variables x, y, \dots , second-order variables X, Y, \dots (of each arity ≥ 0), and the logical symbols $\rightarrow, \forall x, \forall X$.

We have the usual definitions:

$$\begin{aligned}\perp &\equiv \forall X.X \\ \neg A &\equiv A \rightarrow \perp \\ A \wedge B &\equiv \forall X.(A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow X)) \rightarrow X \\ A \vee B &\equiv \forall X.(A \rightarrow X) \rightarrow ((B \rightarrow X) \rightarrow X) \\ \exists xA &\equiv \forall X.(\forall x(A \rightarrow X) \rightarrow X) \\ \text{etc.}\end{aligned}$$

Curry Howard for Classical second-order logic

Define a derivation system of typing judgements $\Gamma \vdash t : A$ where Γ is a variable declaration $x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n$, the A_i are second-order formulas and t is a term:

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash x : A} (x : A) \in \Gamma$$
$$\frac{\Gamma, x : A \vdash t : B}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x. t : A \rightarrow B}$$
$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A \rightarrow B \quad \Gamma \vdash u : A}{\Gamma \vdash tu : B}$$
$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A}{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall x A} \quad x \notin FV(\Gamma)$$
$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall x A}{\Gamma \vdash t : A[e/x]}$$
$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A}{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall X. A} \quad X \notin FV(\Gamma)$$
$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall X. A}{\Gamma \vdash t : A[P/X]}$$

And one classical rule (Peirce's Law):

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \alpha : ((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A) \rightarrow A}$$

Examples of derivable judgements:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{pair} &\equiv \lambda xyz.zxy & : & \forall XY.X \rightarrow (Y \rightarrow X \wedge Y) \\ \mathbf{fst} &\equiv \lambda z.z(\lambda xy.x) & : & \forall XY.X \wedge Y \rightarrow X \\ \mathbf{left} &\equiv \lambda xuv.ux & : & \forall XY.X \rightarrow X \vee Y \\ \mathbf{right} &\equiv \lambda yuv.vy & : & \forall XY.Y \rightarrow X \vee Y \end{aligned}$$

and also

$$\mathbf{EM} \equiv \alpha(\lambda k.\mathbf{right}(\lambda x.k(\mathbf{left}x))) : \forall X.X \vee \neg X$$

Realizability

Suppose we are given a set U of individuals. Relative to an assignment of variables, where elements of U are assigned to first-order variables and functions $U^k \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\Pi)$ are assigned to k -ary predicate variables, we now assign to any formula A a set of stacks $\|A\|$, a set of “witnesses against A ”. The set of *realizers* of A , written $|A|$, is defined as

$$|A| = \{t \in \Lambda \mid \forall \pi \in \|A\| \ t * \pi \in \perp\}$$

The definition is simple:

$$\begin{aligned}\|A \rightarrow B\| &= |A|. \|B\| = \{t.\pi \mid t \in |A|, \pi \in \|B\|\} \\ \|\forall x A\| &= \bigcup_{u \in U} \|A(u)\| \\ \|\forall X.A\| &= \bigcup_{F: U^k \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\Pi)} \|A(F)\|\end{aligned}$$

Then $|\forall x A| = \bigcap_{u \in U} |A(u)|$, etc.

A complication: if the pole \perp is empty, we always have: $|A| = \emptyset$ or $|A| = \Lambda$. We have classical, two-valued semantics.

On the other hand, if the pole contains one process, say $t * \pi$, then by the rule (Restore) we have $k_\pi * t.\pi' \in \perp$ for any π' ; whence by (Push), $k_\pi t * \pi' \in \perp$ for any π' ; which means that $k_\pi t \in |A|$ for any A , in particular for $A \equiv \forall X.X$.

Therefore we say: a closed formula A is *true* under this realizability, if its set $|A|$ of realizers contains an element of PL, the set of proof-like terms.

Strong Soundness Theorem Suppose the typing judgement $x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n \vdash t : B$ is derivable; suppose that relative to an assignment ρ we have $u_1 \in |A_1[\rho]|, \dots, u_n \in |A_n[\rho]|$. Then

$$t[u_1/x_1, \dots, u_n/x_n] \in |B[\rho]|$$

Note that the hypothesis implies that t is proof-like; so if u_1, \dots, u_n are proof-like, so is $t(u_1, \dots, u_n)$.

Examples

1. For any A, B and term t :

$$t \in |A \rightarrow B| \Rightarrow \forall u(u \in |A| \Rightarrow tu \in |B|)$$

For, suppose $\pi \in \|B\|$, $u \in |A|$. Then $u.\pi \in \|A \rightarrow B\|$ so $t * u.\pi \in \perp$; by (Push), $tu * \pi \in \perp$.

2. For any A and B : if $\pi \in \|A\|$ then $k_\pi \in |A \rightarrow B|$. For, suppose $\pi \in \|A\|$, $u.\rho \in \|A \rightarrow B\|$ so $u \in |A|$, $\rho \in \|B\|$. Then $u * \pi \in \perp$ whence by (Restore), $k_\pi * u.\rho \in \perp$.

3. Let us see that α realizes Peirce's Law: suppose

$t.\pi \in \|((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A) \rightarrow A\|$, so $t \in |(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A|$, $\pi \in \|A\|$.

Then $k_\pi \in |A \rightarrow B|$, so $k_\pi.\pi \in \|(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A\|$. Hence

$t * k_\pi.\pi \in \perp$. By (Save), $\alpha * t.\pi \in \perp$. we conclude that

$\alpha \in |((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A) \rightarrow A|$

Equality and the natural numbers

Given a set X of individuals we can put for $e, e' \in X$:

$$\begin{aligned}\|e \asymp e'\| &= \bigcup_{F: X \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\Pi)} \|F(e) \rightarrow F(e')\| \\ &= \|\forall X.X(e) \rightarrow X(e')\|\end{aligned}$$

If $X = \mathbb{N}$ and we have function symbols for the basic functions on \mathbb{N} , we can realize most of the Peano axioms:

$$\begin{aligned}\forall x \neg(x = 0) \\ \forall xy(s(x) = s(y) \rightarrow x = y) \\ \text{etc.}\end{aligned}$$

but not induction. For induction to work, we have to relativise the quantifiers to a predicate N , defined by:

$$N(x) \equiv \forall X.(X(0) \wedge \forall y(X(y) \rightarrow X(s(y)))) \rightarrow X(x)$$

So far the treatment of Krivine/Miquel. Can we understand this interpretation in terms of categorical logic?

Definition. A tripos on Set is a pseudofunctor $P : \text{Set}^{\text{op}} \rightarrow \text{Preord}$, satisfying:

a) For each set X the preorder PX is endowed with a binary operation $(\cdot) \rightarrow (\cdot)$ which obeys the laws of intuitionistic implicative logic (e.g., $\phi \leq \psi \rightarrow \phi$,

$\theta \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \leq (\theta \rightarrow \phi) \rightarrow (\theta \rightarrow \psi)$);

b) For every function $f : X \rightarrow Y$ of sets, the map $Pf : PY \rightarrow PX$ preserves \rightarrow up to isomorphism. Moreover, Pf has a right adjoint $\forall f$, which satisfies the Beck condition and the condition that for $\phi \in PX$, $\psi \in PY$,

$$\forall f(Pf(\psi) \rightarrow \phi) \simeq \psi \rightarrow \forall f(\phi)$$

c) There is a *generic predicate*: a set Σ and an element $\sigma \in P\Sigma$ with the property that for every $\phi \in PX$ there is a function $\{\phi\} : X \rightarrow \Sigma$ such that $P\{\phi\}(\sigma) \simeq \phi$.

Every tripos on \mathbf{Set} gives rise to a model of second-order logic.
Formulas with parameters from a set X are interpreted as elements of PX

Second-order (unary) predicates are interpreted as elements of Σ^X (where Σ is the carrier of a chosen generic predicate)

The element relation must be an element of $P(\Sigma^X \times X)$: it can be taken as $P(\text{ev})(\sigma)$ where $\text{ev} : \Sigma^X \times X \rightarrow \Sigma$ is the evaluation map.
A closed formula is interpreted as an element of $P1$ (1 a fixed one-element set); it is *true* if its interpretation is the top element in this preorder.

For a tripos P on Set we can construct a topos $\text{Set}[P]$:
 Objects are pairs (X, \sim) where \sim is an element of $P(X \times X)$ such
 that the statements

$$\forall xy(x \sim y \rightarrow y \sim x), \forall xyz(x \sim y \wedge y \sim z \rightarrow x \sim z)$$

are true in the tripos P

A morphism $(X, \sim) \rightarrow (Y, \sim')$ is an equivalence class of a
 "functional relation": an element of $P(X \times Y)$ for which
 statements saying that it is extensional w.r.t. \sim and \sim' ,
 single-valued and total, are true in the tripos P

The topos $\text{Set}[P]$ has a *natural numbers object*: an object N
 together with morphisms $1 \xrightarrow{o} N$ and $N \xrightarrow{s} N$ such that for every
 diagram $1 \xrightarrow{x} X \xrightarrow{f} X$ there is a unique map $h : N \rightarrow X$ making the
 following diagram commute:

$$\begin{array}{ccccc}
 1 & \xrightarrow{o} & N & \xrightarrow{s} & N \\
 & \searrow x & \downarrow h & & \downarrow h \\
 & & X & \xrightarrow{f} & X
 \end{array}$$

To construct a natural numbers object in $\text{Set}[P]$, take any set M with an element m and an injective function $M \xrightarrow{\tau} M$ for which $m \notin \text{rge}(\tau)$. Define a predicate on M in the topos P (i.e., an element of PM):

$$N(x) \equiv \forall X.(m \in X \wedge \forall y(y \in X \rightarrow \tau(y) \in X) \rightarrow x \in X)$$

Now if one defines $\sim \in P(M \times M)$ by

$$x \sim y \equiv N(x) \wedge x \asymp y$$

then (M, \sim) is a natural numbers object in $\text{Set}[P]$

Krivine's realizability defines a Boolean tripos \mathcal{K} on Set : for a set X , let $\mathcal{K}X$ be the set of functions $X \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\Pi)$. Given such a function ϕ , we define $|\phi(x)|$ by

$$|\phi(x)| = \{t \in \Lambda \mid \forall \pi \in \phi(x) \ t * \pi \in \perp\}$$

Define \rightarrow on $\mathcal{K}X$ by

$$(\phi \rightarrow \psi)(x) = \{t.\pi \mid t \in |\phi(x)|, \pi \in \psi(x)\}$$

The order is given by: $\phi \leq \psi$ if and only if $\bigcap_x |(\phi \rightarrow \psi)(x)|$ contains a proof-like term.

For $f : X \rightarrow Y$, $\mathcal{K}f : \mathcal{K}Y \rightarrow \mathcal{K}X$ is given by composition with f . So $\mathcal{K}f$ preserves \rightarrow and is order-preserving. Its right adjoint $\forall f$ is given by

$$\forall f(\phi)(y) = \|\forall x(f(x) \asymp y \rightarrow \phi(x))\|$$

Recall that $\|\forall x(f(x) \asymp y \rightarrow \phi(x))\| = \bigcup_{x \in X} \{t.\pi \mid t \in |f(x) \asymp y|, \pi \in \phi(x)\}$

For any tripos P on Set , the equality \asymp gives rise to a functor $\nabla : \text{Set} \rightarrow \text{Set}[P]$: send X to (X, \asymp) .

The natural numbers object N is a subobject of $\nabla(\mathbb{N})$

Sometimes, N is isomorphic to $\nabla(\mathbb{N})$. In traditional intuitionistic realizability examples, $\nabla(\mathbb{N})$ has 0 and a successor map but no discernable arithmetical structure.

Miquel has investigated the inclusion $N \subset \nabla(\mathbb{N})$ in a particular model (i.e., choice of pole) of Krivine realizability. There is very interesting structure there! Somewhat of the flavour of nonstandard arithmetic/analysis.

Thomas Streicher has given a reformulation of Krivine's realizability in terms reminiscent of combinatory logic.

An *abstract Krivine structure* consists of:

- a set Λ of “terms”, with elements K , S and α

- a subset PL of Λ : the ‘proof-like terms’

- a set Π of “stacks”

- an application operation $t, s \mapsto ts : \Lambda \times \Lambda \rightarrow \Lambda$

- an operation $t, \pi \mapsto t.\pi : \Lambda \times \Pi \rightarrow \Pi$

- an operation $k_{(-)} : \Pi \rightarrow \Lambda$

- and a ‘pole’, a saturated subset \perp of $\Lambda \times \Pi$

As usual, we write elements of $\Lambda \times \Pi$ as $t * \pi$

The saturatedness of \perp means that the following axioms are satisfied:

- (S1) if $t * s.\pi \in \perp$ then $ts * \pi \in \perp$
- (S2) if $t * \pi \in \perp$ then $K * t.s.\pi \in \perp$
- (S3) if $tu(su) * \pi \in \perp$ then $S * t.s.u.\pi \in \perp$
- (S4) if $t * k_\pi.\pi \in \perp$ then $\alpha * t.\pi \in \perp$
- (S5) if $t * \pi \in \perp$ then $k_\pi * t.\pi' \in \perp$

Again, we have a tripos: $PX = \mathcal{P}(\Pi)^X$

$\phi \leq \psi$ if and only if $\bigcap_{x \in X} |\phi(x) \rightarrow \psi(x)|$ contains a proof-like element, where:

$$|\chi(x)| = \{t \in \Lambda \mid \forall \pi \in \chi(x) \ t * \pi \in \perp\}$$

$$\phi(x) \rightarrow \psi(x) = \{t.\pi \mid t \in |\phi(x)|, \pi \in \psi(x)\}$$

Streicher's formulation facilitates drawing a parallel with 'relative realizability'.

A *partial combinatory algebra* (pca) is a set A with a *partial* application function $t, s \mapsto ts : A \times A \rightarrow A$, and elements k, s satisfying:

$$\begin{aligned}kxy &= x \\sxyz &\simeq xz(yz)\end{aligned}$$

Given a pca A we have a tripos P_A , the *realizability tripos* on A : $P_A X = \mathcal{P}(A)^X$; $\phi \leq \psi$ iff $\bigcap_{x \in X} \phi(x) \rightarrow \psi(x)$ is nonempty, where for $U, V \subseteq A$: $U \rightarrow V = \{a \in A \mid \forall x \in U ax \in V\}$

In a pca one can define λ -terms. For example, $\lambda x.x = SKK$

Examples of pcas:

\mathbb{N} with $nm = \{n\}m$

$\mathbb{N}^{\mathbb{N}}$ with 'partial continuous application'

Relative realizability triposes:

now we consider an inclusion $A^\sharp \subset A$ of pcas such that the application on A^\sharp is the restriction of the one on A , and A^\sharp contains elements k and s which satisfy the axioms for both A and A^\sharp .

Prime example: $A = \mathbb{N}^{\mathbb{N}}$, A^\sharp is the set of total recursive functions (this gives the notion of 'Kleene-Vesley' realizability).

We have a relative realizability tripos $P_{A^\sharp, A}$:

$$P_{A^\sharp, A}X = \mathcal{P}(A)^X$$

$\phi \leq \psi$ iff $\bigcap_x \phi(x) \rightarrow \psi(x)$ contains an element of A^\sharp .

In the case of a realizability tripos P_A , the preorder $P_A \mathbf{1}$ is equivalent to the total order on two elements.

In the case of $P_{A^\sharp, A}$, $P_{A^\sharp, A} \mathbf{1}$ can be very complicated. In our prime example ($A = \mathbb{N}^{\mathbb{N}}$, A^\sharp the set of recursive functions), $P_{A^\sharp, A} \mathbf{1}$ is equivalent to the (opposite of the) *lattice of Medvedev degrees*.

Fix a subset \mathcal{U} of $A - A^\sharp$ (a nontrivial Medvedev degree).

We shall define an abstract Krivine structure à la Streicher.

Let $\Lambda = A$, and Π the set of coded finite sequences of elements of A (in any pca, one has a coding of such sequences). Let $a.\pi$ be the code of the sequence obtained by appending a to the sequence coded by π .

Define a pole \perp by:

$$\perp = \{t * \pi \mid t\pi \text{ is defined and an element of } \mathcal{U}\}$$

define a new, total, application on A by:

$$a \cdot b = \lambda \pi. a(b.\pi)$$

Our set PL of proof-like terms is $A^\#$.

For the rest of the structure, let $\pi_{\geq k}$ be a code of the sequence π_k, π_{k+1}, \dots , if π is code of the sequence π_0, π_1, \dots . Then define:

$$\begin{aligned} K &= \lambda \pi. \pi_0(\pi_{\geq 2}) \\ S &= \lambda \rho. \rho_0(\rho_2. [\lambda \nu. \rho_1(\rho_2.\nu)]. \rho_{\geq 3}) \\ k_\pi &= \lambda \rho. \rho_0 \pi \\ \mathfrak{C} &= \lambda \rho. \rho_0(k_{\rho_{\geq 1}}. \rho_{\geq 1}) \end{aligned}$$

We have: (S1) if $t * s.\pi \in \perp$, then $t(s.\pi) \in \mathcal{U}$, so $(t \cdot s)\pi \in \mathcal{U}$, therefore $t \cdot s * \pi \in \perp$, etc.

The tripos obtained from this abstract Krivine structure can equivalently be described as follows:

define a new preorder on the sets $P_{A^\#,A}X$, by putting:

$\phi \leq \psi$ iff the set $\bigcap_x \phi(x) \rightarrow [(\psi(x) \rightarrow \mathcal{U}) \rightarrow \mathcal{U}]$ contains an element of $A^\#$.

The topos one constructs from this tripos is the Booleanization of a cosed subtopos of $\text{Set}[P_{A^\#,A}]$